

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2118

S E C R E T SEOUL 1270

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EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, KS, US

SUBJECT: KOREA MISSILE DEVELOPMENT - IBM COMPUTER APPLICATION

REF: (A) STATE 032700, (B) SEOUL 737, (C) SEOUL 1085,  
(D) SEOUL 1106

SUMMARY. I REQUEST THAT THE POLICY ENUNCIATED IN REF A  
BE REVIEWED. END SUMMARY.

1. I VIEW THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION ON THE IBM COMPUTER  
APPLICATION AS BEING SHORT-SIGHTED. I AM MOREOVER CONCERNED  
WITH THE WHOLE TENOR OF REF A WHICH GOES TO THE HEART OF  
OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH ROK.

2. TAKING REF PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH, I HAVE THE FOLLOWING  
COMMENTS:

A. RE PARAGRAPH ONE: WHY DID DEPARTMENT "BELIEVE IT  
ADVISABLE TO TAKE ACTION ON APPLICATION" NOW? WE HAVE  
JUST SUBMITTED REFS C AND D WHICH RAISE THE FUNDAMENTAL  
ISSUES OF OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH ROK. REF C  
ATTEMPTS TO EMPHASIZE THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE  
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VARIOUS ISSUES, POINTING OUT THAT NO SINGLE ISSUE  
SHOULD BE VIEWED IN ISOLATION. ON THE CONTRARY, A DECISION  
IN ONE FIELD MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ITS IMPACT ON OTHER  
AREAS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. REF D SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED  
"TRANSFER OF ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS OR TECHNTLOGY". I  
THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION ON THE IBM COMPUTER  
TO BE PREMATURE AND PRE-EMPTIVE, UNTIL BROADER POLICY

ISSUES ARE SORTED OUT.

B. RE PARAGRAPH TWO: WITH REFERENCE TO THE SENTENCE, "OUR POLICY REMAINS....WE HAVE PROVIDED IT", WITHOUT WISHING TO CHALLENGE THE POLICY OR THE EXTENT OF ITS APPLICATION NOW (SINCE I ASSUME THAT IT WILL BE REVIEWED IN THE NEAR FUTURE), I WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE ROKG HAS A VALID CASE FOR INSISTING THAT THE HONG NEUNG APPLICATION MEETS THE CRITERION. WE ARE THEN FACED WITH CHALLENGING THE CREDIBILITY AND GOOD FAITH OF OUR ALLY. THIS MAY BE NECESSARY ON OCCASION BUT IS IT NECESSARY NOW WHEN FAVORABLE DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IN NUCLEAR/MISSILE FIELD.

C. RE PARAGRAPH THREE: I FULLY AGREE THAT A "FURTHER PERIOD OF CLOSE MONITORING" IS NECESSARY. THE QUESTION IS "HOW?" ARE WE BETTER ABLE TO MONITOR BY BEING COOPERATIVE (CARROT TECHNIQUE) OR BY BEING "TOUGH" (STICK TECHNIQUE), OR IS A COMBINATION OF BOTH NEEDED? WHAT DO WE LOSE BY APPROVING TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY ALREADY AVAILABLE TO ROK? IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT ADD ALREADY HAS ACCESS TO THE KIST CDC-6600 COMPUTER, WHICH EMBODIES A TECHNOLOGY AND CAPABILITY COMPARABLE TO THE IBM 370-158; THEREFORE, SALE OF THE IBM COULD INCREASE THE ROK CAPACITY FOR DATA STORAGE AND PROCESSING, BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A CAPABILITY NOT ALREADY AVAILABLE. THERE ARE MANY VALID REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH INCREASED DATA STORAGE AND PROCESSING CAPACITY. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE TAEJON FACILITY IS PLANNED TO SERVE AS THE MND CERTRALIZED TECHNICAL DATA REPOSITORY AND WILL REQUIRE A COMPUTER

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CAPABILITY TO INSTITUTE THE U.S. ARMY TECHNICAL DATA MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM. FINALLY, WE COULD VERY WELL BE PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF THE PROPONENTS OF ROK'S LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND NUCLEAR WARHEADS DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS BY OUR "STONE WALLING" APPROACH. ALSO WE SHOULD IN NO WAY SUFFER THE DELUSION THAT THE U.S. IS THE ONLY SOURCE FOR MODERN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY. A JAPANESE COMBINE, FUJITSU-HITACHI, IS MARKETING A HITAC-M-170 COMPUTER WHICH IS ADVERTISED AS EQUIVALENT TO THE IBM-370-158. IT IS ALSO INCONSISTENT TO WISH TO MONITOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE PROGRAMS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY DENYING OURSELVES A KEY CHANNEL FOR MONITORING BY REQUIRING JUSMAG TO BE "CIRCUMSPECT" AND "NOT BE DRAWN INTO PLANNING". IN ANY CASE, NOT ALL "NEW ADD MISSILE PROGRAMS" SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AUTOMATICALLY AS BEING INIMICABLE WITH U.S. INTERESTS.

D. RE PARAGRAPH FIVE: THE DECISION ON THE SRC 21256 WOULD BE EQUALLY PREMATURE AND PRE EMPTIVE. THIS ISSUE IS BEING ADDRESSED IN DETAIL IN A JUSMAG-K MESSAGE TO FOLLOW.

E. RE PARAGRAPH SIX: WE MUST CHALLENGE EMPHATICALLY  
THE STATEMENTS IN THIS PARAGRAPH WHICH SUGGEST THAT ALL

R&D ON ADVANCED WEAPONS IS UNACCEPTABLE TO U.S. BECAUSE  
ALL SUCH ACTIVITIES WOULD BE VERY DESTABILIZING. IN THE  
FIRST PLACE, THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN THIS PARAGRAPH  
GO FAR BEYOND ANY POLICY PREVIOUSLY ENUNCIATED TO ROKG.  
SECONDLY, THE BROAD GENERALIZATION IS SO UNDISCRIMINATING  
TO BE UNSUPPORTABLE. THERE ARE CERTAINLY WEAPON SYSTEMS  
AND RELATED R&D WHICH ARE NOT (RPT NOT) DESTABILIZING,  
PARTICULARLY THOSE IN THE AIR DEFENSE FIELD. AFTER ALL,  
WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY FOR ADVANCE  
WEAPONS R&D (I.E. NIKE-HERCULES). FINALLY, THE STATEMENT  
THAT ALL R&D FOR ADVANCE WEAPONS IS DESTABILIZING NEEDS  
MORE SUPPORT THAN PROVIDED TO DATE. THE QUESTION OF  
DESTABILIZATION IS CERTAINLY A CRITICAL ONE, BUT IT NEEDS

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FULLER REVIEW. THIS IS APPARENT IN REF A.

4. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: I BELIEVE REF A INCLUDES  
STATEMENTS AND ASSERTION THAT IF TAKEN LITERALLY WILL  
HAVE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS  
WITH ROK. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND THAT THE DECISION ON THE  
IMB COMPUTER AND ANY OTHER POLICY STATEMENTS IN REF A BE  
HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING DEPARTMENT'S ANALYSES AND DECISIONS  
ON KOREAN POLICY ISSUES.

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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** MASS, KS, US, IBM  
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